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Abstract
This paper has not been published with copyrighted proceedings and was
only presented, in french, in a national conference.
The theorems about incompleteness of arithmetic have often been cited as an
argument against automatic theorem proving and expert systems. However, these
theorems rely on a worst-case analysis, which might happen to be overly pes-
simistic with respect to real-world domain applications. For this reason, a new
framework for a probabilistic analysis of logical complexity is presented in this
paper. Specifically, the rate of non-decidable clauses and the convergence of a set
of axioms toward the target one when the latter exists in the language are studied,
by combining results from mathematical logic and from statistical learning. Two
theoretical settings are considered, where learning relies respectively on Turing
oracles guessing the provability of a statement from a set of statements, and com-
putable approximations thereof. Interestingly, both settings lead to similar results
regarding the convergence rate towards completeness.
1 INTRODUCTION
Inspired by the “Learning to Reason” framework [Khardon and Roth, 1997], this paper
investigates the conditions for a hybrid inductive-deductive system (IDS). This system
is provided with a set of axioms or statements (e.g. examples), and its goal is to de-
termine the truth value of any further statement e. We consider a framework for deal-
ing with undecidable theories as well; this is a main difference with many previous
works ([Shapiro, 1981]). We will often refer to arithmetic or set theory, but many other
essentially undecidable theories could be considered instead of this. From a mathe-
matical logic perspective, the question is whether i) the available set of statements is
complete, and ii) the logical setting is complete. Under these assumptions, the truth
value of e is determined using mathematical deduction; the algorithmic challenge is to
provide an efficient search engine for constructing a proof of e or ¬e. When the set
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of statements is not complete, by definition there exists statements e which can nei-
ther be proved nor refuted; the famous Go¨del’s theorem (1931) states that sufficiently
powerful logical settings (e.g. including arithmetic) are incomplete. When the set
of statements is not sufficient for deciding relevant statements, inductive reasoning is
needed to find additional axioms, consistent with the available ones and sufficient for
determining the truth value of e. The challenge here is to compare the different natural
methods available for adding new axioms. From a hybrid inductive-deductive per-
spective, the logical setting considered must thus be examined with respect to both its
completeness (deduction-oriented performances), and its VC-dimension or PAC learn-
ability (induction-oriented performances, Appendix A.2). Typically, statements C(1),
C(3), C(5), C(7), ¬C(4), ¬C(6), ¬C(2), C(217), ¬C(200) do not allow deduction
of ∀n C(2n + 1) ∧ ¬C(2n). In the meanwhile, inductive logic programming might
learn the hypothesis ∀n C(2n + 1) ∧ ¬C(2n), which could in turn allow for many
other deductions. This paper examines the convergence properties of an inductive-
deductive system, i.e. the probability that the n + 1-st example can be proved from
the axioms learned from the previous n examples. The originality of the work is to
propose a probabilistic analysis of logical decidability and completeness, contrasting
with the worst-case analysis and undecidability results used in the literature. Indeed, a
worst-case perspective does not account for the fact that many relevant statements can
yet be proved in an undecidable setting. The rest of this section describes the proposed
framework, discusses the relevant work and introduces the results reported in the paper.
Formalisation. This paper considers a first order logic language, where the initial
set of axioms Z is an essentially undecidable ([Kleijnen, 1992, p277], [Tarski, 1949])1
set of axioms with finite description length2 such as the Zermelo-Fraenkel set of ax-
ioms.
Let us consider a sequence of examples or statements ei, independently and iden-
tically distributed from a probability distribution M . We further assume that M is
consistent with Z, in the sense that Z ∪ {e s.t.M(e) > 0} is consistent. From each
set of examples En = {e1, ..., en}, the system extracts a recursive set of axioms noted
An, which together with Z allows for proving every example in En. Three types of
induction are distinguished:
• in deduction, An includes all examples in En, except those examples ei which
could be proved from the theory learned from the previous examples (i.e. all ei
except those such that Ai−1,Z ` ei). An thus is an independent axiom set.
• in pruned-deduction, An is a minimal subset of En, sufficient to prove every
example in En (An,Z ` En).
• in induction-deduction, An is a set of axioms, minimal wrt its description length,
such that every example in En can be proved from An and Z. Contrasting with
deduction and pruned-deduction, An is no longer necessarily included in En.
The theoretical case where (deductive, pruned-deductive and inductive-deductive)
learning is based on Turing oracles will first be considered in sections 3 and 4, respec-
1A set of axioms is essentially undecidable if any recursive extension of this set is undecidable.
2In all the paper, the description length refers to any classical mathematical notation of statements or
proofs. Note that a set of axioms with finite description length can include an infinite axiom schema.
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tively devoted to the cases where the target set of axioms is finite and infinite.
Section 5 extends the analysis, considering Turing-computable-approximations of Tur-
ing oracles, based on finite-length proofs.
Goals of the study. The behavior of an inductive-deductive system is examined
with respect to three stochastic variables, modeling respectively the completeness, the
accuracy and the compactness of the current axiom set (noted An in the following
instead of An,Z for simplicity of notation):
• the incompleteness of An refers to the probability Ln that An does not allow
for deciding on further examples (Ln = M({e s.t. An 6` e ∧ An 6` ¬e})); in
order to distinguish this incompleteness from the standard logical one, it will be
refered to as the relative incompleteness;
• the error or falsity of An is the probability that An decides wrongly on further
examples3;
• the compactness is measured as the description size DL(An) of the current ax-
iom set (this is not related to other definitions of compactness, but we keep this
notion as no ambiguity arises).
It must be noted that the behavior of the relative incompleteness rate Ln is known
in some specific cases:
• In case Z is a complete set of axioms, no learning is required ; An = Z leads to
Ln = 0 as for any e, Z ` e or Z ` ¬e.
• Otherwise, if M is modified at each time step n by a malign adversary with
unrestricted computational power, then after Go¨del’s first theorem, Ln = 1 for
all n, as the adversary can choose M concentrated on some undecided e.
Thus, our framework lies between the (too simple, unrealistic) complete case, and the
(too difficult, pessimistic) straightforward application of essential undecidability.
The goal is to examine the practical limitations of learning in a powerful language
(e.g. including the axioms of set theory or arithmetic). The limitations of such lan-
guages regarding completeness and decidability issues are well known; these limita-
tions have significant impact on inductive learning as well. For example, in languages
including arithmetic there are always infinitely many theories proving a finite consistent
set of statements; discussions around this fact are referred to as Quine’s underdetermi-
nation thesis [List, 1999, Norton, 2003, Shook, 2002]. However, it might be the case
that the problems entailed by incompleteness and undecidability, though certain, are
actually not frequent. And if there are an infinite number of solutions to a finite learning
problem (Quine’s underdetermination thesis), then it might be interesting to assess the
average quality of these solutions. Therefore, our goal is to provide a statistical study of
the relative incompleteness, compactness and falsity of learned theories, applying the
statistical learning methodology and body of results to other learning criteria, namely
3Note that in the deduction or pruned-deduction cases, An cannot be inconsistent with en+1 since An ⊆
En and distribution M is assumed to be consistent with Z.
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the probability of facing an undecided example or introducing inconsistencies in the
theory.
Related work. As far as we know, the simultaneous use of deduction and induction
has not been studied yet in a statistical perspective though the three domains involved
(automatic deduction, inductive and statistical learning, mathematical logic) have some
intersections4. Along an inductive-deductive setting, the works related to Quine’s un-
derdetermination thesis [List, 1999, Norton, 2003, Shook, 2002] focused on a worst
case analysis; they do not integrate the statistical learning and generalization aspects.
Other studies deal with some kinds of incomplete frameworks, e.g. involving recursion
theory and referring to Turing machines with oracles or infinite-time Turing machines
[Hamkins, 2002]. However, this work focuses on extending the set of decidable state-
ments and the role of induction is not considered.
Overview of the paper. As an alternative to the worst-case analysis, the frame-
work proposed in this paper is based on a logically consistent probability distribution
M over the set of statements. In each step n, the system outputs a set of axioms
An from the first n statements, and one examines whether this set allows for prov-
ing further statements. As noted earlier on, if these further statements are selected
in a worst-case manner, An does not allow for deciding their truth value even with
unbounded computational resources. However, a worst-case perspective often leads
to overly pessimistic conclusions [Cheeseman et al., 1991]. The probabilistic setting
proposed is inspired by the standard Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) frame-
work [Valiant, 1984], and the study borrows the standard statistical learning tools
(VC-dimension [Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1974]) in order to bound the relative in-
completeness expectation Ln = M({e s.t. An 6` e ∧An 6` ¬e}).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces general definitions and
lemmas used in the rest of the paper. Section 3 presents results about the induction
of a target theory with bounded description length, comparing the deductive, pruned-
deductive and inductive-deductive learning settings. It is shown that (corollaries 1-4):
i) in all cases, non-asymptotic performance depends on the underlying distribution M
and it might be arbitrarily bad (as in the worst-case setting); ii) induction-deduction,
and more generally restrictions on the description length entails faster convergence
rates than deduction ; iii) for any algorithm with a faster completeness convergence
rate than deduction, there exists a distribution such that the error or falsity is not almost
surely zero (∃M, e s.t. ∀n, P (An ` ¬e) > 0 and M(e) > 0); iv) pruned learning can
behave arbitrarily badly in the sense of an infinite asymptotic description length. Sec-
tion 4 considers the case of a target theory with infinite description length, and presents
negative results (corollaries 5-8): i) arbitrarily slow convergence rates can occur; ii)
the length of the axiom set can increase fast. However, the completeness rate goes to
1 as the number of examples goes to infinity. While results presented in sections 3 and
4 are based on an oracle (axiomatic optimization or theorem proving with unbounded
computational power), section 5 considers the case of Turing-computable approxima-
tions of such an oracle. Results similar to those of the oracle case are presented (with,
unfortunately, a huge computational complexity). The paper ends with a discussion
4Some advances in mathematical logic have been exploited for automatic theorem proving, for instance
Craig’s interpolation theorem is used to design a “partition-based” logic [Amir and McIlraith, 2003].
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of the presented results; a short introduction to the terminology and state of the art is
given in Appendix A.
For space limitations, some proofs are omitted in the paper, and can be found in
[Baskiotis et al., 2007].
2 FORMAL BACKGROUND
Let Z denote a consistent essentially undecidable set of axioms (e.g. Zermelo-
Fraenkel). We note DL(A) the description length of an axiom set A, and by abuse
we use also DL(e) = DL({e}). Let T ′ denote the set of consistent theories including
Z, and let T ⊂ T ′ be the set of consistent theories defined from an axiom set with
finite description length (T = {t ∈ T ′, ∃A s.t. A ` t,DL(A) < ∞}). T and T ′ can
be viewed as boolean mappings from the set of well-formed statements (t(e) = 1 iff
t ` e).
This section examines the VC-dimensions and shattering properties of both T and
T ′ spaces.
Theorem 1 [Baskiotis et al., 2007]: T has infinite VC-dimension.
Although T and therefore T ′ both have infinite VC-dimensions, they differ by their
shattering properties :
Theorem 2 [Baskiotis et al., 2007]: T ′ shatters an infinite set. The above theorem
implies significant differences about learning in the search spaces T and T ′. Specifi-
cally, in the case of T ′ there exists distributions leading to arbitrarily slow convergence
rates, such as C/ log(log(log(n))) where n is the number of examples. In contrast, we
shall see that a reasonable convergence rate is obtained within T , although the conver-
gence can be delayed due to adverse distributions.
3 THE FINITE DESCRIPTION LENGTH CASE
Let M denote a probability distribution on the well-formed statements, such that the
mass of M is restricted to a consistent theory t in T (∃t ∈ T s.t. M(t) = 1). A
first negative result concerns the incompleteness convergence rate. We show that there
exists a distribution M such that the incompleteness rate is bounded from below.
In the corollary below, as in corollary 5, we will use a link between supervised
learning (i.e. learning statements with their truth values) and unsupervised learning
(i.e. finding theories covering true statements). This link is based on the fact that stating
e is exactly equivalent to stating ¬e. A distribution M on couples (x, y) = (e, true)
or (x, y) = (e, false), where e is a statement, can be replaced by a distribution M
such that M(e) is the probability of (e, true) plus the probability of (e, false), as well
as we can identify sets of axioms with classifiers (the associated classifier separates
theorems and non-theorems). This allows the use of counter-examples from learning
in the framework of this paper. A family of classifiers (for supervised learning) such
that for any learning algorithm ELn ≥ c for some distribution on these classifiers,
is identified with a family of sets such that for any algorithm, for some distribution
ELn ≥ c.
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Corollary 1 : for any n > 0, for any δ > 0, for any method generating An, there
exists a generator of examples (distribution M ) such that E[Ln] ≥ 12exp(1) − δ.
Remark : This result can be reformulated as: for any n > 0, for any δ > 0, there
exists M such that after n examples the learned theory is at distance at least 12exp(1)−δ
from the target one. Note that the above distribution M depends on n.
Proof of corollary 1 : Follows from theorem 1 and the lower bound cited in Ap-
pendix A.2.

Let us first consider the fine learning case, restricting the description length of the
induced axiom set. By abuse of notation, in the following the description length of a
theory derived from an axiom set A is set to DL(A).
Theorem 3 [Baskiotis et al., 2007]: Let Ts denote the set of theories in T which
can be generated from a set of axioms with description length less than s, and let Vs
denote the VC-dimension of Ts. Vs is finite as Ts is finite. For each theory t, let V (t)
be defined by V (t) = inf{Vs|t ∈ Ts}.
Let V denote V (t∗) where t∗ is the target theory, assuming it is finite. Let tn denote
the theory extracted along induction-deduction after n examples.
Then the following results hold :
1. Convergence rate : if n > V ,
P (Ln > ) ≤ 2(2 exp(1)n/V )V 2−n/2
2. Asymptotic behavior : almost surely, there exists n0 such that
n ≥ n0 ⇒ Ln = 0
3. T does not shatter any infinite set.
4. V (tn) ≤ V .
Let us now consider the deduction and pruned-deduction learning settings.
Theorem 4 [Baskiotis et al., 2007]: Consider the deduction or pruned-deduction
settings. For any decreasing sequence an bounded by 1/2 and converging to 0, there
exists a probability distribution M such that i) ∀n,Ln ≥ an ; ii) there exists t ∈ T (i.e.
DL(t) <∞) such that M(t) = 1 .
Corollary 2 : In the deduction or pruned-deduction framework, for any decreasing
sequence an upper bounded by 1/2, there exists M such that for any n the relative
incompleteness of An is bounded from below by a sum of n independent binary random
variables Xi, where Xi takes value 1/0 with probability (ai, 1 − ai). In particular,
under distribution M , the relative incompleteness of An is greater than
∑
i≤n ai.
Corollary 3 : Theorem 4 and corollary 2 can be extended to any learning method
producing a minimal (wrt set inclusion) theory such that it covers examples e1, . . . , en.
Proof : This is a direct corollary of the proof of theorem 4. 
Corollary 4 : Any method which does not incur the limitations stated by theorem 4
or corollary 2, can with non-zero probability select a theory An which is strictly larger
(wrt set inclusion) than the minimal theory generated from {e1, ..en}. In particular,
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for some distribution, there is a positive probability of generating a theory inconsistent
with some statement of non-zero measure.
Proof : Reformulation of corollary 3. 
4 THE INFINITE DESCRIPTION LENGTH CASE
Removing the finite length assumption has significant impact on the convergence re-
sults obtained in the previous section, notably in relation to the lower bounds on the
convergence rate (see Appendix A.2). In the proof of the following corollary, we use
the same correspondence as explained before corollary 1.
Corollary 5 : for any decreasing sequence (an) running to 0 and upper-bounded
by 1/16, there exists a distribution of examples such that E(Ln) ≥ an.
Proof : Direct consequence of the lower bound on the convergence rate in Ap-
pendix A.2. 
Corollary 6 : for the deduction or pruned-deduction settings, E[DL(An)] ≥∑
i≤n ai.
Corollary 7 : In all learning cases such that the empirical error rate is null, Ln
goes to 0 (in the sense that for any  > 0, P (Ln > )→ 0).
Corollary 8 : For all learning methods such that An is consistent and proves all
statements e1, . . . , en, there exists a distributionM such that the compactnessDL(An)
goes to infinity.
Proof : Consider M a distribution which support is a consistent non-recursively
axiomatizable set of statements. For any axiom set A let M(A) be the measure for
M of all statements proved from A (M(A) =∑e s.t. A`eM(e)). Consider K(), the
minimal description length over all axiom sets A such that M(A) greater than 1 − .
K() is non-decreasing, and lim→0K() = ∞. It is sufficient to see that Ln < 
implies that DL(An) > K(). 
These results show that although the error rate goes to 0 as the number of examples
increases, the convergence rate can be arbitrarily low. Moreover, the description length
of the induced theory cannot be bounded, as showed above.
5 TURING-COMPUTABLE ALGORITHMS :
PROOFS OF BOUNDED LENGTH
By definition, deduction, pruned-deduction and induction-deduction all rely on Turing
machines with oracles. As a first step toward a practical analysis, this section considers
instead approximate learning, based on Turing machines without oracles and bounded
length reasoning5. The approximation is considered from an algorithmic complexity
perspective.
Section 5.1 is devoted to a complexity analysis of axiomatic optimization. This
result is used in section 5.2 to provide a bound on the convergence of pruned-deductive
5Since recursion theory provides negative results in the case of proofs with arbitrary length (ie, the set of
statements that can be proved, in many cases, is not recursive but only recursively enumerable), we restricted
this study to proofs with bounded length.
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and deductive-inductive learning toward the target theory, in the case where the latter
is finite.
5.1 Algorithmic complexity
Let us consider as hypothesis space the sets of axioms with finite description length
(possibly including axiom schemas; proofs using axiom schemas are allowed as
well). Let us define the k-deduction as follows: statement e is k-proved from the
set of axioms A, noted A `k e, if there exists a proof of e from A with descrip-
tion length less than k. The algorithmic complexity of k-deduction (i.e. the com-
plexity required to decide the fact that a statement e is k-proved from A) is upper
bounded by a function noted Complexity(DL(A), k,DL(e)). In the arithmetic set-
ting considered, Complexity(DL(A), k,DL(e)) is dominated by a 2k term (consid-
ering all 2k strings of length k and determining whether they are proofs of A ` e).
Along the same lines, the k-consistency of a set of axioms is defined as follows: A
is k-consistent, noted A 6`k⊥ if there is no proof with length smaller than k that
A is inconsistent. Similarly, the algorithmic complexity of k-consistency is upper
bounded by Complexity(DL(A), k,DL(⊥)). Therefore, the generality and consis-
tency tests (respectively, B `k A and B 6`k⊥) can be performed with complexity∑
e∈A Complexity(DL(B), k,DL(e)), over all statements or axiom schemas e in A.
The following proposition is then straightforward.
Proposition : Complexity of axiomatic optimization
Assume that there are at most 2n sets of axioms with description length less
than n. Given a set A of statements, axiomatic optimization aims at a set of ax-
ioms B with minimal description length such that it entails all statements in A :
Find Arg minB{DL(B)|B `k A, B 6`k⊥}. Its complexity is upper bounded by
O
(
2DL(A) ×DL(A)× Complexity(DL(A), k,DL(A))
)
5.2 Axiomatic optimization
Given a set En of statements, the point here is to find a minimal set An of axioms,
using a finite number δn of computation steps to check An consistency and complete-
ness wrt En. We show that if δn increases sufficiently fast, there exists an algorithm
with essentially same convergence results as in the oracle-based analysis (section 3).
Practically, let δ1, . . . , δn denote a sequence of integers. Then:
• Let Tn+1 be the set of statements that can be proved with proofs of length at
most δn from An ;
• An is a6 minimal description length set of axioms such that: i) An proves all
examples in En with proof of length at most δn; ii) An does not prove ⊥ with
proof of length at most δn.
6In case of equality, the first axiom set in lexicographic order is retained.
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Note that An is not necessarily a minimal set of axioms in the usual sense, e.g. one
of the axioms could be proved from the others (but its presence makes it feasible to
prove k-completeness). We note A∗ the shortest axiom set capable of proving any e
in the target theory (i.e. such that M(e) > 0). Let Ln here denote Ln = M({e; e 6∈
Tn+1 ∨ (¬e) ∈ Tn+1}).
Theorem 5 [Baskiotis et al., 2007]: Consider e a random variable on statements
with probability law M and assume that the mean and the variance of the shortest
proof of e from A∗ are finite, and assuming further that δn = Ω(n3), then ,




2. An reaches A∗ almost surely, and thus is consistent for n sufficiently large.
3. Ln ≤ ′ with probability at least 1− pn, − 2S 2−n′/2 for any , ′ > 0, where
S is the number of axioms sets with description length bounded by DL(A∗) + .
This result shows that the theory extracted by induction-deduction (using Turing
machines with no oracle and bounded-deduction) is consistent, for sufficiently large
number of examples; that its description length converges toward the optimal one, and
finally, that its relative incompleteness goes to 0 as O(1/
√
n).
In summary, Theorem 5 shows that a Turing-machine algorithm with no oracle can
implement an inductive-deductive system, with essentially the same performances and
limitations regarding consistency and completeness as in the theoretical case. Indeed
the complexity of this algorithm is exponential in n.
6 DISCUSSION
A probabilistic relational setting has been proposed in this paper to study inductive-
deductive systems (IDS). Precisely, from a random generator providing statements and
their truth values, the IDS extracts a set of axioms via one among three settings: the
deduction one corresponds to a purely deductive algorithm; the pruned-deduction one
extracts a minimal excerpt of the statements, sufficient to prove all seen statements;
and the inductive-deductive setting selects the set of axioms with minimal description
length such that it proves all seen statements. Two cases are distinguished: the “finitely
describable” (FDR) and “non-finitely describable” (NFDR) realities respectively cor-
respond to the case where the target set of axioms has a finite (resp. infinite) descrip-
tion length. FDR and NFDR cases are confronted to deduction, pruned-deduction and
induction-deduction settings, considering two criteria: relative incompleteness (propor-
tion of statements which cannot be proved from the current theory) and compactness
(description length of the current theory). Though relative incompleteness always goes
to 0 as the number of examples goes to infinity, its convergence rate can be arbitrarily
low in all cases, except when reality is finitely describable and in a inductive-deductive
setting, in other words, when the system actually performs induction. In this favorable
case, the target concept is reached almost surely in finite time. Along the same lines, the
description length of the extracted theory is unbounded (for adverse distributions) in all
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cases, except again when reality is finitely describable and in a inductive-deductive set-
ting. This result provides additional precisions related to Quine’s under-determination
thesis. Despite the multiplicity of theories consistent with a finite set of statements,
if the IDS system extracts the theory consistent with the statements already seen, that
is minimal wrt its description length (as opposed to, wrt its set inclusion), then a fast
convergence in terms of both incompleteness and length can occur granted that the re-
ality is “finitely describable”. Interestingly, there exists some distributions in the latter
case which entail errors and not only undecidabilities; i.e. there are cases such that the
event ∃n;An ` ¬e has strictly positive probability. This result can be interpreted in
the light of Popper’s notion of falsifiability, central to the history of science; as shown
by the very general corollary 4, if one abstains from producing hypotheses which can
be falsified by examples, the convergence rate of the IDS is not better than that of rote
learning. The last part of this paper has shown that the above theoretical results, ob-
tained for Turing machines with oracles, essentially hold for Turing machines without
oracles − although the considered algorithms are indeed of limited use due to their
huge computational complexity. In summary, the main ambition of this paper is to
contribute to a less pessimistic view of inductive-deductive systems in relational logic,
than allowed by a worst-case analysis and based on undecidability results.
A STATE OF THE ART AND DEFINITIONS
This appendix briefly summarizes the notations and learnability results used in the pa-
per. Notation supX , where X is a real-valued random variable, denotes the (possibly
infinite) supremum of the x such that P (X > x) > 0.
A.1 Logical notations
A theorem is a statement which can be proved, which depends on both the logical
setting and the axiom set considered. The paper only considers classical logic. Each
axiom set A includes Z and has finite description length. After Go¨del’s theorem, there
exists thus e such that neither e nor ¬e can be proved from A. For the feasibility of
the study, it is assumed that Z is consistent, although in many cases of interest, this
has not been proved (and cannot be, e.g. for Zermelo Fraenkel, after Go¨del’s theorem).
Notation A ` e (respectively A `k e) denotes the fact that e can be proved from A
(resp. with proof of description length less than k). In the whole paper, the description
length DL(·) (of sets of axioms or proofs) refers to a standard logic coding (with no
compression).
A.2 Statistical learning theory
The interested reader is referred to [Devroye et al., 1997], [Vidyasagar, 1997] for an
exhaustive presentation. Let Z denote the example space, and let F denote the hypoth-
esis space, where each hypothesis is viewed as a subset of Z. A set X of examples
is said to be shattered by F if for any subset X ′ of X there exists f ∈ F such that
f ∩ X = X ′. The VC-dimension of F is the cardinal of the largest finite set that is
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shattered by F . If arbitrarily large such sets exists, then the VC-dimension is said infi-
nite. Hypothesis h is consistent with a set of examples X iff h∩X = h∗∩X , where h∗
denotes the target concept. A learning algorithm associates a consistent hypothesis hn
to each training set Xn made of n iid examples drawn according to some probability
distribution M . Accordingly, the loss variable Ln stands for the error expectation of hn
(M{z, z ∈ Z, hn(z) 6= h∗(z)}). Fundamental results in the statistical learning theory
can be summarized as: if the VC-dimension is finite, then the error expectation goes to
0 reasonably fast as the number of examples goes to infinity.
Theorem, case of null empirical error (see [Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1974],
[Devroye et al., 1997, Th. 12.7, p202]) :
Define Lˆ(P ) = 1s
∑s
i=1 χP (xi) 6=yi and L(P ) = EχP (X) 6=Y , with the (xi, yi) a
sample of size s iid according to the law of the random variable (X,Y ).
Consider F a family of boolean functions on a domain X and let V be its VC-
dimension. Then, for any  > 0 if s > V ,
P ( sup
P∈F;Lˆ(P )=0
|L(P )− Lˆ(P )| ≥ ) ≤ 2 (2exp(1)s/V )V 2−s/2
where (2 exp(1)s/V )V can be replaced by the 2s-shattering coefficient of F.
Lower bound : ([Devroye et al., 1997, p239], theorem 14.3). Assume that the VC-
dimension of F is infinite. Then for any n > 0, for any δ > 0, for any classification
rule, there exists at least one distribution such that ELn ≥ 12 exp(1) − δ and F contains
at least a function f such that L(f) = 0.
Lower bound on the convergence rate : Assume that F shatters an infinite set.
Then for any sequence (an) decreasing to 0 and upper bounded by 116 , for any classi-fication rule, there exists at least one distribution such that ∀n ELn ≥ an whereas F
contains f such that L(f) = 0.
Mainly, the difference with the previous result is that the distribution does not de-
pend upon n.
Lemma : learning on countable domains Consider learning on a countable do-
main with a distribution and an algorithm ensuring that the empirical error Lˆ is zero.
Then, the generalization error almost surely converges toward 0.
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